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CIVIL PROCEDURE 
SUMMARY 
TOWNSEND v. HOLMAN CONSULTING 
CORP.: RULE 11 SANCTIONS, IGNORANCE 
OR VIGOROUS LITIGATION IS NO EXCUSE 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In a unanimous en banc ruling, the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals, in Townsend v. Holman Consulting Corp.,I held that 
an attorney may be sanctioned under Rule 11 of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure2 for a partially frivolous 3 pleading. The 
1. Townsend v. Holman Consulting Corp., 914 F.2d 1136 (9th Cir. 1990)(en 
banc)(per Fletcher, C. J.; the other panel members were Wallace, J., Tang, J., F. Poole, 
J., Nelson, J., Noonan, J., Q'Scannlain, J., Trott, J., concurring, Canby, J., and Preger-
son, J.). 
2. FED. R. CIV. P. 11 deals with disciplinary sanctions to check abuses in signing of 
pleadings. The rule provides in part, 
The signature of an attorney constitutes a certificate by the 
signer that the signer has read the pleading, motion, or other 
paper; that to the best of the signer's knowledge, information, 
and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded 
in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argu-
ment for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing 
law, and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, 
such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless 
increase in the cost of litigation .... If a pleading, motion, or 
other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court . . . 
shall impose . . . an, appropriate sanction. 
The provisions apply to motions and other papers by incorporation of FED. R. CIV. P. 7 
(b)(2) and 7(b)(3). Sanctions may be imposed on the attorney, the party the attorney 
represents or both. 
39 
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court rejected the argument that the pleadings could not be the 
subject of sanctions because they also included non-frivolous re-
quests for relief.· Prior Ninth Circuit decisions had permitted 
imposition of Rule 11 sanctions only when the pleading as a 
whole was frivolous. Ii 
This decision expands attorney liability under Rule 11 and 
vacates an earlier panel decision of the Ninth Circuit,S which 
had reversed the district court's orders imposing sanctions.7 
II. FACTS 
After an unsuccessful state court action, Patrick Townsend, 
an employee of a contracting company, sued in federal court for 
the payment of medical benefits under an Employer Benefit 
Plan (Plan).8 The complaint named the law firm of Wilson & 
Reitman (Wilson), which had represented the Plan in the state 
court action as one of the defendants.9 Wright, the attorney for 
the Townsends,I° alleged that Wilson had "advised the Plan to 
adopt certain provisions challenged in the suit, counseled the 
Plans' administrators not to make payments to Townsend and 
3. Townsend, 914 F.2d at 1137. Frivolous is a term used by the Ninth Circuit "to 
denote a filing that is baseless and made without a reasonable inquiry." Id. at 1140. 
4. Id. at 1138-39. 
5. See Murphy v. Business Cards Tomorrow, Inc., 854 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1988) 
(Rule 11 sanctions inappropriate of pleading as a whole is not frivolous or harassing). 
The holding in Murphy interpreted a passage in Golden Eagle Dist. Corp. v. Burroughs 
Corp., 801 F.2d 1531, 1540-41 (9th Cir. 1986) (Rule 11 sanctions inappropriate where 
only a portion of an otherwise meritorious pleading is frivolous) to include not just legal 
arguments but also allegations. Townsend, 914 F.2d at 1141. In Golden Eagle, the court 
addressed two issues: whether a lawyer's failure to identify a legal argument as an exten-
sion of existing law rather than application of existing law was sanctionable, and whether 
a lawyer's failure to cite contrary authority in violation of the American Bar Associa-
tion's ethical rules was sanctionable. Townsend, 914 F.2d at 1141. The court dealt with 
legal arguments not allegations or claims. Townsend, 914 F.2d at 1141. The en bane 
court in Townsend emphasized that the passage in Golden Eagle which stated the dis-
trict court could not impose sanctions because "a particular argument or ground for re-
lief contained in a non-frivolous motion is found to be unjustified" referred solely to 
legal arguments in support of claims. Townsend, 914 F.2d at 1140-41. 
6. See Townsend v. Holman Consulting Corp., 881 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1989) (Town-
send I). 
7. Townsend, 914 F. 2d at 1139. 
8. Townsend I, 881 F.2d at 788. 
9. Id. at 791. 
lO. Townsend, 914 F.2d at 1138. 
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improperly obstructed the unsuccessful state court action."ll 
Wilson moved to dismiss the complaint and requested sanc-
tions. 12 He included affidavits, from the President of the Plan 
and from another attorney who represented the Plan, stating 
that the firm had been involved with the Plan only during the 
state litigation process and did not participate in the adoption, 
implementation, or administration of the Plan. iS Wright did not 
rebut the affidavits. l' In an amended complaint, Wright dropped 
the allegation that Wilson had given advice regarding the adop-
tion of Plan provisions, but continued to name the firm as a de-
fendant involved in conduct which injured his client. 1D Wilson 
again moved to dismiss the amended complaint and again re-
quested sanctions. 16 
The district court dismissed the complaint and permitted 
Townsend to file a second amended complaint against all de-
fendants except Wilson. 17 The court also imposed a Rule 11 
sanction against Wright finding that Wright had sued "without 
a reasonable investigation, without adequate basis in law or fact, 
and for the purposes of harassment. "18 
Wright filed a notice of appeal of the sanction order/9 then 
moved for reconsideration of the sanction or in the alternative 
for a stay pending appeal. 20 The district court denied the motion 
and imposed an additional $500 sanction.21 The court deter-
mined that the motion for reconsideration was frivolous, because 
the filing of a notice of appeal divested the district court of ju-
risdiction.22 The motion for a stay pending appeal was also de-
11. Id. at 1139. 
12. Id. 
13. Id. 
14. Townsend, 914 F.2d at 1139. 
15. Id. 
16. Townsend I, 881 F.2d at 791. 
17. Id. The claims against Wilson & Reitman were dismissed with prejudice. Id. The 
Townsend's did submit a second amended complaint. The district court dismissed all of 
the Townsend's claims with prejudice. Id. 
18. Townsend, 914 F.2d at 1139. The district court imposed a Rule 11 sanction in 
the amount of $3,000 finding that the conduct of the Townsend's attorney was "plainly 
nothing short of outrageous." Townsend I, 881 F.2d at 791. 
19. Townsend, 914 F.2d at 1139. 
20. Id. 
21. Id. 
22. Townsend, 914 F.2d at 1139. The district court stated that the filing of a post-
3
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termined to be frivolous because it did not comply with FED. R. 
CIV. P. 62.28 Wright appealed the order for further sanction.24 
The appeals of both sanctions were consolidated.2lI 
Originally, a three-judge panel for the Ninth Circuit re-
versed both sanction orders in Townsend I finding that neither 
appeal could be sanctioned as frivolous, because neither was 
frivolous as a whole.26 The Ninth Circuit took the case en banc 
to reconsider Rule 11 sanctions for partially frivolous 
pleadings.27 
III. COURT'S ANALYSIS 
A. BACKGROUND 
Rule 11 provides that a paper, certified by an attorney, 
must be sanctioned if the paper is filed for an improper purpose 
or is frivolous, both baseless and made without reasonable and 
competent inquiry.28 Improper purpose and frivolousness are in-
dependent grounds.29 Either ground is sufficient to sustain a 
sanction.30 An objective standard is used to review both grounds, 
the "reasonableness under the circumstances" standard.S ! A spe-
appeal motion was against "obvious and well known principle[sl of law." Townsend I, 
881 F.2d at 791. 
23. Id. FED. R. CIV. P. 62 (c) requires the appellant to give a supersedeas bond at or 
after the time of filing of the notice of appeal in order to obtain a stay. The stay is 
effective when the supersedeas bond is approved by the court. 
24. Townsend, 914 F.2d at 1139. 
25. Id. 
26. Townsend I, 881 F.2d at 794. The first amended complaint had named non-
frivolous defendants, and the motion for reconsideration was not frivolous in aski~g for a 
stay pending appeal. Id. at 795, 797. 
27. Townsend, 914 F.2d at 1139. 
28. Townsend v. Holman Consulting Corp., 914 F.2d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 1990) The 
two clauses of Rule 11: "well grounded in fact and warranted by existing law" and "im-
proper purpose" clauses are linked by the conjunction "and". Because both clauses are 
certified to by the attorney when signing, the rule suggests each clause is to be viewed 
independently. Id. (quoting Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 832 (9th Cir. 
1986) (filing of federal court action claiming that recall petition violated Voting Rights 
Act was good faith argument that was grounded in fact and not interposed for any im-
proper purpose). 
29. Townsend, 914 F.2d at 1140. See Zaldiuar, 780 F.2d at 832. The court in Town-
send emphasized that while separate and distinct inquiries, the two grounds often over-
lap. Evidence regarding frivolousness is often highly indicative of improper purpose. 
Townsend, 914 F.2d at 1140. 
30. Townsend, 914 F.2d at 1140. 
31. Id. (citing Zaldiuar, 780 F.2d at 829). The 1983 Amendments to Rule 11 changed 
4
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cial rule applies when the court considers complaints which ini-
tiate actions. S2 In order to determine that a complaint is filed for 
an improper purpose a court must first find that it was 
frivolous. 33 
In Townsend, the district court had imposed sanctions on 
the first amended complaint on both frivolousness and improper 
purpose grounds.s4 For this reason, and because a finding of im-
proper purpose must be supported by a finding of frivolousness 
for a complaint, the Ninth Circuit considered the frivolousness 
issue.36 
1. Frivolousness 
The Ninth Circuit found that a previous panel of the Ninth 
Circuit, in Murphy v. Business Cards Tomorrow, Inc.,36 had 
misinterpreted a passage in Golden Eagle Distribution Corp. v. 
Burroughs Corp.37 that discussed Rule 11 to include frivolous al-
legations.38 The passage read: 
Nothing in the language of the Rule or the Advi-
the standard against which an alleged violation is to be tested. Prior to 1983, Rule 11 
required subjective bad faith by the signing attorney. The new standard tests the knowl-
edge of the attorney by a reasonableness under the circumstances standard. While the 
former standard required the signing attorney to make a willful violation of the rule, the 
new standard does not require the violation to be willful. "There is no room for a pure 
heart, empty head defense under Rule 11." Zaldivar, 780 F.2d at 829 (quoting 
Schwarzer, Sanctions Under the New Federal Rule II-A Closer Look, 104 F.R.D. 181, 
187 (1985)). 
32. Townsend, 914 F.2d at 1140. 
33. [d. (citing Zaldivar, 780 F.2d at 832), in which it was found that a defendant 
cannot be harassed under Rule 11 if the plaintiff files a complaint which is "well . 
grounded in fact and warranted by existing law." The court in To'wnsend noted that 
greater protection must be given to the complaint which is the means by which a plain-
tiff seeks to obtain substantive legal rights. The court noted that enforcement of the 
private plaintiff's substantive legal rights may often benefit the public in advancing pub-
lic policies, even if the motive for asserting the claim is not entirely pure. Townsend, 914 
F.2d at 1140. 
34. [d. The district court stated, "[p)laintiff did not make the 'reasonable inquiry' 
required by Rule 11 and it is found that suing the lawyers was not in good faith and for 
the purposes of harassment." Townsend, 914 F.2d at 1140. The Ninth Circuit noted that 
the district court's finding of no reasonable inquiry was equivalent to a finding of frivo-
lousness, baseless and made without a reasonable and competent inquiry. ld. 
35. [d. 
36. 854 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1988). 
37. 801 F.2d 1531, 1540-41 (9th Cir. 1986). 
38. Murphy, 854 F.2d at 1205. 
5
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sory Committee Notes supports the view that the 
Rule empowers the district court to impose sanc-
tions on lawyers simply because a particular argu-
ment or ground for relief contained in a non-friv-
olous motion is found by the district court to be 
unjustified.89 
The court in Townsend stated that the phrase "ground for re-
lief' referred to legal arguments in support of claims, not allega-
tions or claims.40 In Murphy, the Ninth Circuit, without any dis-
cussion, simply substituted the word "allegations" for the term 
"ground for relief."41 The holding in Murphy was subsequently 
followed in Community Electric Services of Los Angeles, Inc. v. 
National Electrical Contractors Association,42 among other suc-
ceeding cases.4S The court stated that under the logic of Murphy 
and Community Electric, the earlier Ninth Circuit panel deci-
sion in Townsend was understandable." 
However, citing Cooter & Cell v. Hartmarx Corp.;'r, the en 
banc court determined that the central purpose of Rule 11 was 
to deter baseless filings. 46 Because the holding in Murphy would 
allow a party with one non-frivolous claim to add frivolous alle-
gations without the fear of sanctions, the en banc court ex-
39. Townsend, 914 F.2d at 1140. 
40. [d. at 1141. 
41. [d. at 1205. The court stated, "Rule 11 permits sanctions only when the pleading 
as a whole is frivolous or of a harassing nature, not when one of the allegations or argu-
ments in a pleading may be so characterized." [d. 
42. 869 F.2d 1235, 1242-43 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 236 (1990) (Rule 
11 permits sanctions only where pleading as a whole is frivolous). 
43. See Romero v. City of Pomona, 883 F.2d 1418, 1429 (9th Cir. 1989) (that some 
allegations made at the onset of litigation later prove to be unfounded does not make a 
complaint frivolous if the complaint also contains some un-frivolous claims). 
44. Townsend, 914 F.2d at 1141. Community Electric, 869 F. 2d at 1242, stated that 
the language of Rule 11 requires the court to evaluate the pleading or paper filed as a 
whole (quoting Zaldivar, 780 F.2d at 831, emphasizing that Rule 11 sanctions are as-
sessed if the paper is frivolous, legally unreasonable, or without factual foundation). 
45. 110 S. Ct. 2447 (1990) (District Court can impose Rule 11 sanctions after plain-
tiff voluntarily dismissed action. Policy goals of Rule 11 include deterrence and stream-
lining of the judicial process). 
46. Townsend, 914 F.2d at 1141. The court quoted a passage in Cooter & Gell v. 
Hartmax Corp., 110 S. Ct. 2447 (1990) which stated: "It is now clear that the central 
purpose of Rule 11 is to deter baseless filings in District Court, and thus, consistent with 
the Rule Enabling Act's grant of authority, streamline the administration and procedure 
of the federal courts." Townsend, 914 F.2d at 1141 (quoting Cooter & Cell, 110 S. Ct. at 
2454). 
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pressly overruled Murphy.·7 The primary rational was to pre-
vent parties with one non-frivolous claim from adding frivolous 
allegations without fear of sanctions.48 
In response to concerns that Rule 11 sanctions would 
"spawn satellite litigation and chill vigorous advocacy,"49 the 
court found that the best answer was not to construct an "artifi-
cial 'safe harbor' for frivolous allegations or claims" which would 
favor form over substance:!O The Ninth Circuit stated that in 
determining whether a claim was frivolous, the courts should de-
termine if the attorney's inquiry was reasonable under "all the 
circumstances of the case. "lB. 
The court offered several examples of when a determination 
of a "reasonable inquiry under all the circumstances of the case" 
may permit a more limited and cursory inquiry. 52 A determina-
tion of what is reasonable inquiry under the circumstances of 
the case may differ depending on the amount of time available 
and the complexity of the case.53 If a lawyer discovers a poten-
tial cause of action with only a short period of time before the 
statute of limitations expire, a more limited inquiry will be toler-
ated than when there is ample time to investigate before filing a 
complaint. 54 If relevant facts are under the control of the oppos-
ing party, or if the case is complex and initially requires the 
47. Townsend, 914 F.2d at 1141. 
48. Id. The court stated, "[iJt would ill serve the purpose of deterrence to allow, as 
does Murphy, a safe harbor for improper or unwarranted allegations." Id. 
49. Id. (quoting Cooter & Gell, 110 S. Ct. 2447, 2454 (1990)). The Supreme Court in 
Cooter & Gell stated, "[aJthough the rule must be read in light of concerns that it will 
spawn satellite litigation and chill vigorous advocacy, any interpretation must give effect 
to the rule's central goal of deterrence." Cooter & Gell, 110 S. Ct. at 2454. The Ninth 
Circuit offered an example of the chilling of advocacy as attorneys, because of the fear of 
sanctions, refusing cases where courts must recognize new rights. Townsend, 914 F.2d at 
1141. 
50. Townsend, 914 F.2d at 1142. The Ninth Circuit stated that such a safe-harbor 
rule would encourage pleading parties to manipulate the form in which claims were 
presented, allowing combination of frivolous and non-frivolous claims. Id. 
51. Id. The Ninth Circuit stated, "[tJhe answer lies in recognizing, as did the Su-
preme Court in Cooter & Gell, that Rule l1's requirement of a 'reasonable inquiry' 
means an inquiry reasonable under 'all the circumstances of the case.' " Townsend, 914 
F.2d at 1142 (quoting Cooter & Gell, 110 S. Ct. at 2459). 
52. Townsend, 914 F.2d at 1142 (citing examples from the Supreme Court analysis 
of "reasonable inquiry under all the circumstances of the case" in Cooter & Gell, 110 S. 
Ct. at 2459). 
53. Townsend, 914 F.2d at 1142. 
54. Id. 
7
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naming of numerous defendants, such as a complex product lia-
bility case, more leeway may be given to imprecision at the onset 
of litigation. 11I1 
The court cited the Second Circuit's opinion in Oliveri v. 
Thompson,1I6 as a "straight forward, common sense application 
of the 'reasonable inquiry.' "117 Oliveri denoted factors for assess-
ment including knowledge that reasonably could have been ac-
quired at the time the pleading was filed, the type of claim and 
the difficulty of acquiring sufficient information, which party 
had access to relevant facts, and "the significance of the claim in 
the pleading as a whole."lIs Unlike Murphy, the Ninth Circuit in 
Townsend found that the mere existence of a non-frivolous 
claim is not dispositive. 1I9 
The court acknowledged that while Murphy created a 
"bright line" which would decrease satellite litigation, the Rule's 
requirement of a "reasonable inquiry" demands a fact-based in-
quiry for which "bright lines" are not appropriate.60 
2. Legal Distinction Between Improper Purpose in Part and 
Frivolousness In Part 
The en bane court in Townsend noted that with the over-
ruling of Murphy, there was no need for the previous legal dis-
tinction, made by the earlier panel majority,61 which allowed a 
55. Id. 
56. 803 F.2d 1265 (2d Cir. 1986) (analysis of a district courts award of sanctions 
against a civil rights attorney for allegedly instituting and continuing prosecution of mer-
itless and frivolous claims). 
57. Townsend, 914 F.2d at 1142. 
58. Townsend, 914 F.2d at 1142 (quoting Cross & Cross Properties v. SOS Everett 
Allied Co., 886 F.2d 497, 504 (2d Cir. 1989) (citing Oliveri». 
59. Townsend, 914 F.2d at 1142. 
60. Id. at 1142-43. 
61. Townsend, 881 F.2d at 795. The Ninth Circuit, in a majority panel, noted that 
the pleading-as-a-whole rule did not apply to "improper purpose" cases. The panel em-
phasized the difference in the analyses between frivolousness and improper purpose. The 
court stated that "[i]t is illogical, and counter to Golden Eagle, to hold a pleading, ex-
amined as a whole, frivolous if it states a colorable claim for relief. By contrast, there is 
no logical difficulty with a finding that the inclusion in a pleading of an unconscionable 
damages claim (or any other claim), for the purpose of harassing the opposing party, 
renders the pleading unsanctionable under Rule 11. 'Rule 11 permits sanctions [for frivo-
lousness] only where the pleading as a whole is frivolous .... An entire pleading has a 
harassing or improper purpose if the litigant included one of the claims or allegations 
8
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pleading or paper harassing-in-part to be sanctioned but not one 
that was only frivolous-in-part. 62 The court stated that as the 
inquiries into frivolousness and improper purpose frequently 
overlap, a district court may infer that the pleading is filed for 
an improper purpose if there is solid evidence of a pleading's 
frivolousness. 63 The court stated that the inference was permis-
sible because the test for improper purpose is objective.64 
B. ApPLICATION OF PRINCIPLES TO THE CASE 
1. The First Amended Complaint 
The Ninth Circuit held that the sanction of the first 
amended complaint was justified and not an abuse of discre-
tion. 611 The court did not address the issue of whether sufficient 
information existed to name the law partnership of Wilson & 
Reitman in the initial complaint.66 Instead, the court addressed 
the facts found by the district court after the filing of the com-
plaint. The court noted that Wright did not rebut the affidavits 
provided by Wilson in a motion to dismiss.67 Rather, in re-
sponse, Wright filed a first amended complaint that re-alleged 
the firm's involvement.6s The district court determined that 
with that purpose'. " (quoting Community Electric, 869 F.2d at 1242-43). 
62. Townsend, 914 F.2d at 1143. The court emphasized that the holding in Commu-
nity Electric, (a pleading or paper that was harassing in part could be sanctioned) was 
made to reconcile the Murphy reading of Golden Eagle (pleading-as-a-whole rule in-
cludes allegations and claims) with the decision in Hudson v. Moore Business Forms, 
Inc., 836 F.2d 1156, 1162 (9th Cir. 1987), which held that although a defendant's coun-
terclaim was non-frivolous, the four million dollar claim for damages, in the same plead-
ing; was frivolous. The Ninth Circuit, in Hudson, agreed with the district court that 
there was a strong inference from the nature and lack of justification for the defendant's 
damage claim that the claim was filed for an improper purpose. Hudson was therefore 
distinguished, in Community Electric, as an improper purpose case. Townsend, 914 F.2d 
at 1143. 
63. Townsend, 914 F.2d at 1143. The court stated, "[al district court confronted 
with solid evidence of a pleading's frivolousness may in circumstances that warrant it 
infer that it was filed for an improper purpose." Id. 
64. Id. 
65. Id. at 1143. 
66. Id. The court noted in footnote 5, that the sanctioning of claims in initial com-
plaints are more likely to be an abuse of discretion. The court firmly stated that Rule 11 
sanctions are not meant to take precedence over the Federal Rules' generous discovery 
provisions. Id. 
67. Townsend, 914 F.2d at 1144. 
68. Id. The Ninth Circuit majority panel noted that although the first amended 
complaint no longer alleged that the defendants had any role in the adoption of the 
Plan, the complaint still named Wilson & Reitman as defendants. Townsend, 881 F.2d at 
791. 
9
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Wright conducted "absolutely no inquiry" before filing the first 
amended complaint.69 The en banc court determined that the 
lack of inquiry and the baselessness of the allegations justified 
the district court's finding of frivolousness as a ground for Rule 
11 sanction.70 
The Ninth Circuit also held the district court's finding of 
improper purpose to be justified and not an abuse of discre-
tion. 71 The en banc court determined, from the district court 
record, that the district court inferred from the facts72 that the 
naming of Wilson as a defendant in the federal court action was 
"essentially vindictive."73 The Ninth Circuit again noted that 
the test for improper purpose was objective, and determined 
that it was not an abuse of discretion to find that Wright's be-
havior manifested an improper purpose under a reasonableness 
standard.74 
2. The Motion for Reconsideration 
The Ninth Circuit held that the district court was justified 
in finding that the motion to vacate and reconsider was frivo-
lous, and no abuse of discretion had occurred.7~ The district 
court had determined that the attorney should have known that 
filing of an appeal would divest the district court of jurisdic-
tion.76 The Ninth Circuit agreed, stating that a "competent 
69. Townsend, 914 F.2d at 1144. 
70. Id. 
71. Id. The district court stated, "[nlot only does plaintiff not state a cause of action 
against the plan's lawyers, or submit any facts in opposition to the motion for summary 
judgment, the act of suing the opponent's lawyers in this situation is plainly nothing 
short of ou trag eo us ... I d. 
72. Townsend, 914 F.2d at 1144. The Ninth Circuit cited two facts: the fact that the 
allegations were frivolous and the fact that Wilson & Reitman had been the law firm 
which opposed Wright in the state court action. Id. 
73. Id. The court emphasized that in order to defer to the fact-finding power of the 
district courts, the district courts need to give thorough explanations of the reasons for 
sanctions. In this case because Wright conducted absolutely no inquiry, the district 
court's brief statement of findings and reasoning was adequate. Id. 
74. Townsend, 914 F.2d at 1144. 
75. [d. at 1145. 
76. Id. The district court stated, "[als should have been apparent to plaintiff's coun-
sel, the taking of an appeal divested this court of jurisdiction to consider any modifica-
tion of its previous sanction order, even if it was convinced that it should modify the 
order. This is an obvious and well-known principle of law which should have been known 
10
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reading of our rule and precedents would have quickly made 
clear to Wright that he did not follow the correct procedures."77 
However, the en banc court found legally incorrect the dis-
trict court's rationale for finding the motion for a stay frivolous78 
and the district court's holding an abuse of discretion.79 The en 
banc court noted that in International Telemeter v. Hamlin In-
ternational CO.,80 the Ninth Ciruit had held that a district court 
may, at its discretion, permit other securities than a bond.81 The 
court stated that the fact that Wright did not cite International 
Telemeter did not make the motion subject to sanction.82 The 
court held that the motion was warranted under existing law.83 
3. Concurring Opinion 
Judge Canby, joined by Judge Pregerson, concurred with 
the result reached by the majority regarding the first amended 
complaint.84 However, Judge Canby emphasized that sanctions 
should be imposed only when all of the allegations against a par-
ticular defendant are frivolous.85 Differing from the majority, he 
maintained that the previous Ninth Circuit cases had been prop-
erly decided.86 While agreeing that Golden Eagle dealt only with 
legal arguments, Judge Canby emphasized that other portions of 
to plaintiff and obviated the necessity of defendant's expenditure in defending the mo-
tion." Id. at 1144. 
77. [d. at 1145. 
78. [d. 
79. Townsend, 914 F.2d at 1145. The district court stated that the attorney did not 
correctly follow the procedure of FED. R. CIV. P. 62, in posting a supersedeas bond. "[A) 
simple reading of Rule 62 should have answered plaintiff's inquiry about a stay. Accord-
ingly, plaintiff's counsel could not have made the 'reasonable inquiry it [the motion) ... 
is warranted by existing law .. .' since there is no semblance of existing law which would 
have justified the motion." Id. 
80. 754 F.2d 1492 (9th Cir. 1985) (although federal rule provides that a supersedeas 
bond may be used to stay execution of judgment pending appeal, the court has discretion 
to allow alternate forms of judgment guarantee). 
81. Townsend, 914 F.2d at 1145 (citing International Telemeter, 754 F.2d at 1495). 
82. Townsend, 914 F.2d at 1145 (citing Golden Eagle, 801 F.2d at 1541-42) (reversal 
of a district court sanction given because the attorney failed to cite contrary authority). 
83. Townsend, 914 F.2d at 1145. Because the district court erroneously believed 
there were two grounds for the sanction of the motion, the en banc court remanded the 
case for consideration of the amount of the award. Id. 
84.Id. 
85. Id. 
86. Id. at 1146. 
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that opinion were concerned' with the effect of "over-exacting in-
terpretations of Rule 11" which could chill vIgorous advocacy 
and create extensive satellite litigation.87 
Judge Canby stated that Murphy and Community Electric 
were appropriate decisions according to the language of Rule 
11.88 He emphasized that the language of Rule 11 provides that 
the attorney or party signing the pleading, motion, or paper cer-
tifies that "it" is well grounded in fact and law.89 Judge Canby 
asserted that the use of the word "it" refers to the pleading, or 
paper filed as a whole.90 
Judge Canby expressed concern that the majority's ap-
proach of permitting sanctions for partially frivolous pleadings 
could lead to serious abuse.91 He noted that the flexible rule 
could result in after-the-fact scrutiny of pleadings for isolated 
deficiencies.92 Judge Canby asserted that the lack of a bright line 
rule would lead to varying standards and greatly increased satel-
lite litigation over sanctions.93 
Judge Canby stated that he would not overrule Murphy, 
but would slightly modify the bright line rule, and impose sanc-
tions only when all claims against any particular defendant were 
frivolous. 94 He stated that this modification would protect de-
fendants against frivolous lawsuits, establish an easily adminis-
tered boundary, and allow vigorous advocacy.91i 
87. Id. (citing Golden Eagle, 801 F.2d at 1540 n.4, 1541) (expressing concern regard-
ing possible misrepresentation of aggressive and justified representation of the client and 
the expenses of satellite litigation). 
88. Townsend, 914 F.2d at 1146. 
89. Id. 
90. Id. (quoting Community Electric, 869 F.2d at 1242) (language of Rule 11 re-
quires the court to evaluate the pleading or paper as a whole). The majority disagreed 
with Judge Canby'S belief that the plain language of Rule 11 favors the Murphy plead-
ing-as-a-whole rule. The majority stated that the Rule 11 language did not imply that a 
pleading is well-grounded simply because one part of the pleading is well grounded. The 
majority felt that the language simply implied that a minor or insignificant allegation or 
subclaim should not be sanctioned. The majority noted that under Judge Canby's pro-
posed disposition of the case, the court would have to ignore significant parts of a plead-
ing in determining if sanctions are appropriate. Townsend, 914 F.2d at 1143 n.4. 
91. Townsend, 914 F.2d at 1146. 
92. Id. 
93. Id. 
94. Id. 
95. Id. at 1146-47. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
The Ninth Circuit in Townsend addressed whether an at-
torney may be sanctioned for a complaint which is only partially 
frivolous. In deciding that pleadings, motions, or papers may be 
sanctioned even if only frivolous in part, the court overruled 
Murphy u. Business Cards Tomorrow, Inc. As a consequence, 
the court overruled completely the pleading-as-a-whole rule for 
a complaint, or for any other paper. Papers may now be sanc-
tioned if frivolous-in-part or filed for an improper purpose in 
part. In taking this step, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has 
greatly increased the scope of papers which may be sanctioned. 
Donna H. Mullen* 
• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1992 
13
Mullen: Civil Procedure
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1991
